Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU: Setting Policy-Specific Conditionality and Building Domestic Capacities

Why is regulatory convergence towards EU rules more successful in some policy fields than in others within one EU neighboring country? By comparing Ukraine’s convergence towards EU rules in the field of shareholders’ rights and technical standards, I challenge prominent explanations for policy change outside the EU that emphasize misfit and adaptational costs, the institutionalization of EU rules or policy-specific conditionality. In order to deal with the shortcomings of these explanations, it is necessary to disaggregate incentives and capacities of various domestic actors within the particular policy fields. I argue that regulatory convergence in EU neighboring countries is more likely if external actors combine the application of policy-specific conditionality, such as access to the European market, with multiplex capacity-building measures that diversify demand among domestic state regulators and firms and empower them to make their claims

setting policy-specific conditionality and building domestic capacities

1\. Introduction 5 2\. Mapping Divergent Outcomes: Initial Misfit and Policy Change in Ukraine’s Shareholders’ Rights and Technical Standards 7 2.1 Shareholders‘ Rights 8 2.2 Technical Standards 8 3\. Puzzling Policy Change in Ukraine 9 3.1 Misfit and Adaptational Costs 9 3.2 Institutionalization of EU Rules 10 3.3 Policy-Specific Conditionality 11 3.4 Multiplex and Dyadic Capacity-Building 12 4\. Policy Change in Ukraine’s Shareholders’ Rights 13 5\. Policy Change in Ukraine’s Technical Standards 18 6\. Alternative Explanations 21 7\. Conclusion 23 Literature 25Why is regulatory convergence towards EU rules more successful in some policy fields than in others within one EU neighboring country? By comparing Ukraine’s convergence towards EU rules in the field of shareholders’ rights and technical standards, I challenge prominent explanations for policy change outside the EU that emphasize misfit and adaptational costs, the institutionalization of EU rules or policy-specific conditionality. In order to deal with the shortcomings of these explanations, it is necessary to disaggregate incentives and capacities of various domestic actors within the particular policy fields. I argue that regulatory convergence in EU neighboring countries is more likely if external actors combine the application of policy-specific conditionality, such as access to the European market, with multiplex capacity-building measures that diversify demand among domestic state regulators and firms and empower them to make their claims

Development by Stealth: The governance of economic integration in European Union’s Eastern peripheries

Introduction: Economic integration, the removal of tariff and non-tariff restrictions and the unification of economic regulations and policies between different economies is one of the most contested issues among economists, political economists and students of economic development. It is claimed to produce public goods by some (Baldwin, 2004; Balassa, 1965), increase patterns of economic and social exclusion by others (Bieler 2002, 2006; Bohle 2006, 2009). In these debates a special role is played by students of the governance of economic integration who claim that the level of progress in, and the developmental outcomes of market integration are largely shaped by the way integration is governed (Drezner, 2007; Mattli and Woods, 2014; Offe, 2014; Bruszt and McDermott, 2014

Varieties of Social Orders: The political and economic fundamentals of hybrid (in)stability in the post-Soviet space

This paper takes the seminal work of Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast on varieties of social orders as a starting point to introduce a refined typology of limited access orders (LAOs) that integrates the political and economic fundamentals of hybrid (in)stability. We find that LAOs do not necessarily constrain access in the political and economic sphere to the same extent. Some combine relative economic openness with strictly limited political competition, while others constrain access to economic resources but allow for a considerable degree of political opening. This latter type proves to be the most instable type of LAO. The different strategies used by dominant elites to maintain stability in various types of LAOs provide insights into how open access institutions interact with limited access institutions in hybrid regimes. While we develop our typology for six post-Soviet countries from the third wave of democratization that function as LAOs, our typology may be applied to other hybrid regimes as well

Pharmacological inhibition of Akt and downstream pathways modulates the expression of COX-2 and mPGES-1 in activated microglia

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Microglia are considered a major target for modulating neuroinflammatory and neurodegenerative disease processes. Upon activation, microglia secrete inflammatory mediators that contribute to the resolution or to further enhancement of damage in the central nervous system (CNS). Therefore, it is important to study the intracellular pathways that are involved in the expression of the inflammatory mediators. Particularly, the role of the phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase (PI3K)/Akt/mammalian target of rapamycin (mTOR) and glycogen synthase kinase-3 (GSK-3) pathways in activated microglia is unclear. Thus, in the present study we investigated the role of Akt and its downstream pathways, GSK-3 and mTOR, in lipopolysaccharide (LPS)-activated primary rat microglia by pharmacological inhibition of these pathways in regard to the expression of cyclooxygenase (COX)-2 and microsomal prostaglandin E synthase-1 (mPGES-1) and to the production of prostaglandin (PG) E₂and PGD₂.</p> <p>Findings</p> <p>We show that inhibition of Akt by the Akt inhibitor X enhanced the production of PGE₂and PGD₂without affecting the expression of COX-2, mPGES-1, mPGES-2 and cytosolic prostaglandin E synthase (cPGES). Moreover, inhibition of GSK-3 reduced the expression of both COX-2 and mPGES-1. In contrast, the mTOR inhibitor rapamycin enhanced both COX-2 and mPGES-1 immunoreactivity and the release of PGE₂and PGD₂. Interestingly, NVP-BEZ235, a dual PI3K/mTOR inhibitor, enhanced COX-2 and reduced mPGES-1 immunoreactivity, albeit PGE₂and PGD₂levels were enhanced in LPS-stimulated microglia. However, this compound also increased PGE₂in non-stimulated microglia.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Taken together, we demonstrate that blockade of mTOR and/or PI3K/Akt enhances prostanoid production and that PI3K/Akt, GSK-3 and mTOR differently regulate the expression of mPGES-1 and COX-2 in activated primary microglia. Therefore, these pathways are potential targets for the development of novel strategies to modulate neuroinflammation.</p

Development of the PSYCHS: Positive SYmptoms and Diagnostic Criteria for the CAARMS Harmonized with the SIPS

Aim: To harmonize two ascertainment and severity rating instruments commonly used for the clinical high risk syndrome for psychosis (CHR-P): the Structured Interview for Psychosis-risk Syndromes (SIPS) and the Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States (CAARMS). Methods: The initial workshop is described in the companion report from Addington et al. After the workshop, lead experts for each instrument continued harmonizing attenuated positive symptoms and criteria for psychosis and CHR-P through an intensive series of joint videoconferences. Results: Full harmonization was achieved for attenuated positive symptom ratings and psychosis criteria, and modest harmonization for CHR-P criteria. The semi-structured interview, named Positive SYmptoms and Diagnostic Criteria for the CAARMS Harmonized with the SIPS (PSYCHS), generates CHR-P criteria and severity scores for both CAARMS and SIPS. Conclusions: Using the PSYCHS for CHR-P ascertainment, conversion determination, and attenuated positive symptom severity rating will help in comparing findings across studies and in meta-analyses

A la carte: Ukrainian positions on free trade with the EU

Ukraine is negotiating with the EU on a comprehensive free-trade agreement. The east European country is to adopt the regulations of the EU internal market; in exchange, trade barriers such as tariffs will be dismantled. Those opposed to this include all those who profit from an opaque & corruption ridden economics policy & those who could be exposed to greater competitive pressure. In the administrative apparatus, opposition is enormous. The interests of big business by contrast are manifold. Their position on the free-trade agreement is therefore ambivalent, like that of Ukraine's political parties. Adapted from the source document